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ABSTRACT - Security has become ubiquitous in every 
domain today as newly emerging malware pose an ever-
increasing perilous threat to systems. Consequently, 
honeypots are fast emerging as an indispensible forensic 
tool for the analysis of malicious network traffic. 
Honeypots can be considered to be traps for hackers 
and intruders and are generally deployed 
complimentary to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) in a network. 
They help system administrators perform a rigorous 
analysis of external and internal attacks on their 
networks. They are also used by security firms and 
research labs to capture the latest variants of malware. 
However, honeypots would serve a slightly different 
purpose in our proposed system. We intend to use 
honeypots for generating and broadcasting instant 
cures for new and unknown malware in a network. The 
cures which will be in the form of on-the-fly anti-
malware signatures would spread in a fashion that is 
similar to the way malware spreads across networks. 
The most striking advantage of implementing this 
technology is that an effective initial control can be 
exercised on malware. Proposed system would be 
capable of providing cures for new fatal viruses which 
have not yet been discovered by prime security firms of 
the world.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Several security firms across the world are busy 
preparing patches and cures for the plethora of 
malware existent today. But the fact remains that for 
every cure created for a malware, a subtle variant of 
the same malware is created that bypasses all the 
latest security patches thereby nullifying all the hard 
work and effort put in to counter them. To make 
things worse, malware is becoming smarter everyday 
and polymorphic malware are the latest entrants in 
this calamitous game of defeating the opponent. 
These malware are capable of self-reproduction, each 
instance of which adopts a completely different 
identity from its parent. In several recent malware 
outbreaks, especially pertaining to fatal viruses, 
considerable damage had already been done to 
thousands of systems and networks worldwide before 
the viruses were discovered and patches were 
released to invalidate them. Thus, we must create an 
anti-malware mechanism that is capable of creating 
and spreading cure for new variants of malware at the 
same speed and in the same fashion that malware 
adopts for spreading across networks. 
Our research proposal aims at providing a solution to 
the above described problem. We intend to use 
honeypots as a tool to capture new and unknown 
malware. Once detected, our honeypot will create on-
the-fly anti-malware signatures and broadcast them 
throughout the network being guarded by it. 
Individual hosts will then update their anti-malware 
signatures and thus remain protected against any 
threat posed to them by fatal malware. The entire 
process of detection of new malware and the creation 
and broadcast of a cure for it on a particular network 
would ideally be a matter of a few seconds or 
minutes. This is obviously much quicker than waiting 
for major security firms to first discover the new 
malware and then release patches for them. The 
following paragraphs describe the approach that we 
would adopt in order to realize this technology. 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
Detection of new variants of malware is among the 
major research activities that are carried out by 
security firms in the IT industry. A majority of anti-
virus firms and research organizations use honeypots 
to capture variants of existing as well as new 
malware. They work upon the acquired data and 
binary samples to produce patches for defense against 
malware threats. For instance, Avira, an anti-virus 
firm uses distributed honeynets to gather binary 
samples of new malware from networks and subnets 
spread all over the globe [9]. The combination of 
such data from a variety of sources proves to be 
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extremely useful in creating efficient security 
patches. 
 
Another attempt to use honeypots with anti-virus 
capabilities was made by IBM in 2005. The project 
was named Anti-Virus in the Wild [8] and a 
presentation on the same was made in the Virus 
Bulletin Conference in October 2005 at Dublin. It 
consisted of a network of thirteen virtual Windows 
XP systems (each serving as a honeypot) realized 
using four real machines. Each honeypot had one 
popular anti-virus installed on it with no other 
network protection enabled. A single firewall 
guarded the entire network as a whole. The main aim 
of the project was to compare the efficiency of the 
thirteen most popular anti-virus software in the 
industry. 
 
The projects mentioned above have used honeypots 
in accordance with malware detection but their main 
aim was to detect and gather binary samples of 
variants of existing and new malware, especially 
viruses. Our research initiative takes this mechanism 
one step ahead as we intend to generate automated 
cures for malware that will be detected by our 
honeypot. These cures would then spread across the 
network guarded by our honeypot adopting the same 
mechanism that malware uses to propagate itself, 
thereby nullifying the satanic intentions of malware 
creators. 
A concept similar to the one proposed by us has been 
presented by Frank Castaneda, Emre Can Sezery, and 
Jun Xuy in their paper ‘Worm Vs. Worm’ [1]. They 
have proposed a method that transforms a malicious 
worm into an anti-worm to disinfect its original and 
then evaluated this method using the CodeRed, 
Blaster and Slammer worms. In addition, researchers 
at Columbia University, New York have are also 
working on a project named ‘A Network Worm 
Vaccine Architecture’ which presents an architecture 
that is very much in conjunction to that proposed by 
us [7]. 
 
3. PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
The most important consideration in view of our 
solution is that it will be completely network based. 
Our proposed anti-malware system will be divided 
into two major parts: A honeypot server and a thin 
client. An instance of our thin client will be installed 
on each host present in the network being guarded by 
the honeypot server. 
 
The honeypot server can be considered to be the 
protagonist of our anti-malware system. This will be 
a high-interaction research honeypot and shall be 
responsible for detecting all kinds of malware on the 
network under surveillance. To prepare our honeypot 
for this task, we will have to equip it with robust 
malware-detection mechanism. In the first version of 
our system, we would restrict ourselves only to 
pattern-based detection of malware. Heuristics and 
new technologies like buffer overflow protection and 
network port blocking would be considered for 
inclusion into the malware detection mechanism after 
the first version of our system becomes efficient and 
robust. 
 
Apart from the ability to detect malware, our 
honeypot would in the future also be capable of 
generating cures in the form of anti-malware packets 
for every malware detected by it. An anti-malware 
packet will consist of an anti-malware signature, a set 
of operating system undo operations and a harmless 
anti-worm created out of the original malware. The 
signatures would be generated on-the-fly as soon as a 
new malware is detected and then inserted into an 
anti-malware packet. Subsequently, these packets 
would be broadcasted to all the hosts present on the 
network being guarded by our honeypot. 
 
Several technologies would be involved in the 
creation of a mechanism for the detection of malware 
and subsequently for generating anti-malware 
signatures for them. Phenomenal research work is 
currently underway in these areas. We will tweak 
these existing technologies before incorporation into 
our honeypot. This would ensure that our anti-
malware system produces efficient output to the 
maximum possible extent with a minimum number of 
false positives. 
 
 
3.1 THE MALWARE DETECTION PHASE 
 
The first phase of our system involves monitoring of 
all network traffic that passes through our honeypot 
and detection of code that possibly may be malicious 
in nature. Suspected pieces of malicious code will 
then be redirected to a virtual machine installed on 
the honeypot itself. Program monitoring tools in the 
virtual machine would then perform analysis on the 
code to ensure if it really is malicious in nature or 
not. If the code is indeed of malicious nature, then the 
virtual machine would further monitor its activities 
and create a log of the changes that the code makes to 
the operating system. Therefore, in order to reduce 
overheads on the honeypot as well as the virtual 
machine, it is important for the malware detection 
algorithms that will be used in this phase to be 
extremely robust. These algorithms should also 
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produce as few false positives and false negatives as 
possible, although it is not practically possible to 
achieve hundred percent accuracy. 
 
Most of the existing malware detection algorithms 
rely on pre-defined malware signature databases to 
scan network traffic for traces of patterns which are 
known to them. However, the aim of our system is to 
protect a network against new and unknown 
malware. The use of pre-defined signature based 
detection algorithms would not produce satisfactory 
results in our case. Therefore, we need to device a 
new algorithm that would enable us to detect new and 
unknown patterns that may potentially be malicious 
in nature. The following paragraphs define and 
explain the approach adopted by us to accomplish 
this task. 
 
3.2 DETECTION OF MALICIOUS TRAFFIC 
 
In order to detect malicious content in network 
traffic, we must use background services deployed on 
the honeypot as well as the capture device. Windows 
services are the best examples of background 
services. The capture device should be used 
exclusively to capture live network traffic in its 
native format and the other machine should be the 
honeypot where the actual detection process takes 
place. 
 
We propose a malware detector service which 
analyses the captured network traffic, extracts 
relevant network traffic patterns from it and then uses 
several statistical methods to determine which 
patterns may be malicious in nature. It would help if 
the captured packets are converted into packet sets 
before analysis. This improves the statistical analysis 
done on the relevant patterns. 
 
The Bloom filter, conceived by Burton H. Bloom in 
1970, is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure 
that is used to test whether an element is a member of 
a set. False positives are possible, but false negatives 
are not. Elements can be added to the set, but not 
removed (though this can be addressed with a 
counting filter). The more elements that are 
added to the set, the larger the probability of 
false positives. 
 
An empty Bloom filter is a bit array of m bits, all set 
to 0. There must also be k different hash functions 
defined, each of which maps a key value to one of the 
m array positions. 
 
The probability of getting a collision in the Bloom 
Filter varies with the following equation: 
 
 
 
We propose to use a Bloom Filter with 10,000 bits to 
find intersecting patterns between two packets. 
Assuming that each packet size would be 
approximately 1500 bytes, the probability of 
encountering a collision would be as low as 6.1 × 10-4 
. With such a low collision probability, the hashing 
algorithm described below can be deemed robust 
enough for this application. 
 
We would be using a simple hashing algorithm to 
generate hash codes for patterns that are relevant to 
the malware detection process. The main advantage 
of using hashing to compare patterns over direct 
string comparison lies in the speed of comparison. 
Let us consider a pattern (C1 C2 … Cn) to be hashed. 
Let the lower limit of pattern length be K and the 
number of bits in our Bloom Filter be M. Then, 
 
H = c1qk-1 + c2qk-2 + … + ck-1q + ck (Mod M) 
 
Each packet set contains several packets captured in a 
sequence. This ensures that every byte that is 
transferred on a network is also stored in the captured 
packets. Our next task is to extract from these packet 
sets, all the patterns that are relevant to our detection 
process. Relevance may be judged on the basis of 
several parameters, the most common one being 
length. Extremely short patterns (those with length 
less than 10 bytes) have the tendency of occurring 
with high frequencies in malware as well as 
legitimate traffic rendering such patterns useless for 
our algorithm. In contrast, studies show that the 
length of a typical malware code does not exceed a 
certain amount to ensure its fast propagation over the 
Internet. This implies that we need to look for 
patterns with length that is optimal for malware 
identification by setting lower and upper thresholds. 
 
Fang Hao, Murali Kodialam, T.V. Lakshman and Hui 
Zhang state in their publication 'Fast Payload-Based 
Flow Estimation for Traffic Monitoring and Network 
Security' [3] that using a lower threshold in the range 
of 20 bytes to 40 bytes can be considered to be a 
good tradeoff to start with. On the other hand, setting 
the upper threshold is not a simple task and is another 
research problem as we can never be sure of the 
maximum code length that malware developers may 
decide upon. Setting a rigid upper threshold may also 
allow smaller suspicious patterns to pass through our 
detection mechanism. 
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Once we decide a minimum pattern length to be 
searched for, we start scanning each captured packet 
for patterns that might be of interest to us. We 
accomplish this task in groups of two packets each in 
a way similar to that described in [3]. Note that each 
packet set analyzed by us is a separate file which 
contains an array of packets within itself. Thus at any 
point of time, our algorithm analyses a packet set by 
analyzing its constitutional packets in groups of two 
to find patterns that are common to both the packets. 
This procedure can be considered to be a 
modification of the well-known Longest Common 
Substring (LCS) problem. We find patterns of all 
lengths that are common to both the packets currently 
being analyzed but with the restriction that the 
patterns must be of a minimum length as specified in 
our algorithm. 
 
Let us consider two packets P1 and P2 of unequal 
length with the following contents: 
 
Packet P1 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
 
 
Packet P2 
 
The common patterns in the above two packets have 
been shaded appropriately. Assuming that we have to 
find all the common patterns in P1 and P2 with a 
minimum length of 3 bytes (denoted as 3-patterns), 
the following two patterns would be of interest to us. 
We would discard the pattern ‘a’ because it does not 
satisfy our minimum length criteria. 
 
 
 
 
The above described procedure for finding patterns 
relevant to our algorithm is repeated several times for 
all the packet sets in a corpus captured by the Packet 
Capture Service. Every time a new pattern is 
discovered, we store it in a table called the 
Coincidence Count Table along with its hash code 
and the number of times it has been discovered in the 
captured packet corpus. If a particular pattern is 
discovered more than once, its count in the 
Coincidence Count Table is incremented accordingly. 
The coincidence count of each pattern is also used to 
get an estimate of the fraction of captured packets in 
that packet set in which that particular pattern occurs. 
 
Let fQ denote the fraction of the packets containing a 
pattern Q (assuming that we have N packets per 
packet set) and let S(Q) be the coincidence count of 
that pattern. Then, 
 
fQ =  
 
We create one coincidence count table for each 
packet set. Therefore, if we have ten packet sets per 
corpus, we will have ten coincidence count tables 
associated with each corpus. 
 
After all the packet sets are searched for patterns of 
interest to us, our coincidence count tables get ready 
for statistical analysis. We lay more emphasis on 
those patterns that have a higher value of fQ. 
Intuitively, we can set a threshold for fQ above which 
all the patterns need to be analyzed in detail to see the 
changes they make to an OS. However, proceeding in 
this fashion may lead to a high rate of false positives, 
something that we wish to reduce in order to improve 
the overall performance of our system. We therefore 
use a statistical technique called Inverse Distribution 
followed by Standard Deviation to further analyze the 
fQ value of relevant patterns. 
 
An efficient algorithm for performing inverse 
distribution analysis has been presented by Vijay 
Karamcheti, Davi Geiger, Zvi Kedem and S. 
Muthukrishnan in [2]. We wish to use a similar 
technique to reduce the number of false positives 
generated by our detection scheme. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
To test our detection algorithm, we created three 
different windows services: The Packet Capture 
Service, The Corpus Receiver Service and The 
Malware Detector Service. The former service runs 
on the capture device while the other two run on the 
honeypot. We created a trivial FTP for transferring 
captured packets from the capture device to the 
honeypot. As we stated earlier, the captured packets 
are converted into packet sets. Several packet sets are 
clubbed together to form a corpus which is sent 
across to the honeypot using the trivial FTP. For 
testing purposes, we have decided to enclose 100 
packets in one packet set and 10 packet sets in one 
corpus. The capture device we have chosen is a 
server which has global access to the internet. This 
would enable us to experiment with real network data 
for better results. 
 
A M N B C D O P Q G H I J R
G H I J 
B C D 
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The Malware Detector Service on the honeypot 
periodically applies the algorithms described above 
in order to detect possibly malicious traffic in the 
captured packet sets. We have set the periodicity of 
this service as one hour for testing purposes. All 
suspected strings are appended to a file which is 
stored in the honeypot. 
 
We have operated this setup for about four weeks and 
manually analyzed the type of network traffic that is 
deemed malicious by it. Many of the detected strings 
consist of java script and plain HTML code. While it 
is unlikely for plain HTML code to be malicious in 
nature, java script can cause a lot of damage to 
systems and networks if intended to do so. We also 
spread the test virus EICAR on the network and it 
was detected by our system. However, further 
analysis is required in order to correctly identify 
malicious items. Our suggestions of future work in 
the next section can provide some valuable tips for 
continuing research on this topic. 
 
5. FUTURE WORK 
  
Our anti-malware system aims at providing complete 
protection to networks against new and unknown 
viruses. However, it is a well-known fact that 
malware is ever-evolving and malware authors learn 
new tricks everyday to help them easily evade the 
existing security mechanisms. Therefore, the task of 
first detecting unknown suspicious network activity, 
then analyzing them to see the changes they make to 
our operating systems and finally generating cures for 
them are in themselves individual research topics. To 
the best of our knowledge, no such anti-malware 
system exists in the world as of today. Hence, this 
proposal bears tremendous scope for future work in 
the form of enhancements and optimizations to the 
work done by us. 
 
We have limited this paper to the detection of 
possibly malicious network traffic. However, the 
detected mal-strings must be further analyzed to 
ensure that they really are malware and if that is true, 
then what changes they make to the operating system. 
This is a vast research topic which requires in-depth 
knowledge of binary instruction sets and also how an 
operating system functions. Although, we have 
already begun working on this front, a lot more needs 
to be accomplished before our analysis architecture 
can be made robust enough. As a small step towards 
achieving this goal, Amit Vasudevan and Ramesh 
Yerraballi have proposed powerful dynamic fine-
grained malicious code analysis frameworks like 
Cobra [4] and SPiKE [6], to combat malware that are 
becoming increasingly hard to analyze. DOME [5] is 
another host-based technique for detecting several 
general classes of malicious code in software 
executables. Enhanced versions of such frameworks 
can be extremely helpful in analysis of malware. 
 
In addition, we can also install malware aware thin 
clients capable of scanning systems for malware 
known to them on every host in our network. Each 
instance of our thin client will maintain a database of 
anti-malware signatures. As soon as a new signature 
is broadcasted over the network by the honeypot 
server, the thin clients would update their malware 
database with the incoming packet. This would be 
followed by a malware scan of each node by thin 
clients. If the signature of a malware present on our 
network exists in the database of the thin clients, it 
would subsequently be either deleted, healed or 
quarantined by the thin clients, as demanded by the 
situation. Moreover, since the database of the thin 
clients would consist of a very small number of 
definitions as compared to commercially available 
anti-virus and anti-spyware software, the total 
amount of time taken to scan a system would be 
considerably less as compared to other scanners. This 
will result in preservation of valuable computing 
resources. 
 
However, despite the several advantages of our anti-
malware system, it contains certain pitfalls which we 
would overcome in future versions of our system. 
The thin clients installed on each node of a network 
should be able to initialize a scan irrespective of 
whether the honeypot server detects a malware and 
broadcasts its anti-malware definition over the 
network or not. Thus even if a known malware is 
injected into the network via secondary media, its 
detection and removal can be done with the help of 
thin clients. This will enable thin clients to provide 
real time malware protection and external triggers 
will not be required to initiate scans. Additionally, all 
thin clients should be capable of triggering network 
scans whenever they detect a malware. This will 
expedite the process of malware detection and 
removal. 
 
Another major drawback of our system as mentioned 
earlier is that currently our system relies entirely on 
pattern-based detection of malware. After the current 
version of our system becomes efficient and robust, 
we would also include better malware detection 
technologies like heuristics, buffer overflow 
protection and network port blocking into the 
malware detection mechanism of our honeypot. This 
will further help reduce the number of false positives 
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generated during the detection phase by our 
honeypot. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Our anti-malware system has several advantages 
which include protection against new and unknown 
malware threats which have not yet been discovered 
by major security firms. This would also hold true for 
less popular yet harmful malware which are not 
globalized but confined to specific geographical 
locations. Moreover, since the size of the anti-
malware signature database would be very small as 
compared to those contained by popular anti-virus 
and anti-spyware products, system scans performed 
by our thin clients would take very little time 
consequently saving valuable system resources. In 
addition, our honeypot would also serve as a valuable 
research tool for the analysis of new and upcoming 
malware production and distribution techniques. 
 
With the help of our proposed system, we have 
introduced the idea of using honeypots for the 
detection and prevention of new and unknown 
malware, especially localized yet harmful malware 
and also those for which security patches have not yet 
been released by major security vendors. We have 
suggested how our proposal is an extension of the 
work that honeypots are being used currently for. In 
order words, while honeypots are basically used for 
gathering binary samples of newly evolving malware, 
our anti-malware system would use honeypots for 
detecting new and unknown malware. Furthermore, 
our honeypot can also help in generating anti-
malware signatures for the possibly malicious code 
detected by it. These signatures would be broadcasted 
over the network under surveillance and subsequently 
would be used by thin clients to clean malware from 
individual hosts. The algorithm which we propose to 
be used by our honeypot for detecting possible 
malware has also been illustrated in detail. Finally we 
listed the advantages and disadvantages of our 
system. 
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